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Abstract
Introduction: Contracting out health services is a strategy that many health systems in the
developing world are following, despite the lack of decisive evidence that this is the best way to
improve quality, increase efficiency and expand coverage. A large body of literature has appeared
in recent years focusing on the results of several contracting strategies, but very few papers have
addressed aspects of the managerial process and how this can affect results.
Case description: This paper describes and analyses the perceptions and opinions of managers
and workers about the benefits and challenges of the contracting model that has been in place for
almost 10 years in the State of Jalisco, Mexico.
Both qualitative and quantitative information was collected. An open-ended questionnaire was used
to obtain information from a group of managers, while information provided by a self-selected
group of workers was collected via a closed-ended questionnaire. The analysis contrasted the
information obtained from each source.
Discussion and Evaluation: Findings show that perceptions of managers and workers vary for
most of the items studied. For managers the model has been a success, as it has allowed for
expansion of coverage based on a cost-effective strategy, while for workers the model also
possesses positive elements but fails to provide fair labour relationships, which negatively affects
their performance.
Conclusion: Perspectives of the two main groups of actors in Jalisco's contracting model are
important in the design and adjustment of an adequate contracting model that includes managerial
elements to give incentives to worker performance, a key element necessary to achieve the
model's ultimate objectives. Lessons learnt from this study could be relevant for the experience of
contracting models in other developing countries.
Introduction
This article presents results from a research project that
analyses the performance of a model implemented by the
Ministry of Health (MOH) of the State of Jalisco, Mexico,
for contracting private providers with public funds. This
model is a strategy employed by the Jalisco MOH to
extend coverage to populations without access to formal
health services and to increase the efficient use of availa-
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ble resources. With the information gathered through a
study that carried out a comprehensive analysis of the
model, this document presents the perspectives of service
providers and decision-makers regarding the model's
capacity to meet objectives, their particular form of partic-
ipation in the model and issues related to the managerial
process of contracting.
An increasing number of studies in the health literature
document health services contracting by government
authorities [1]. These studies report diverse strategies to
link the public model and the private actors, as well as the
various consequences (positive and negative) in terms of
coverage, efficiency, equity and quality of care. These
models have been favored particularly by developing
countries and some have been evaluated [2-6]. An impor-
tant number of these models have been promoted and
even financed by international development agencies. Yet
few have mobilized national or local fiscal resources for
implementation; one notable exception is Costa Rica [7].
Furthermore, few articles focus on the managerial aspects
of contracting-out [8]. Management can be regarded as a
process to carry out allocative, costing, standardizing and
purchasing decisions and activities to achieve institu-
tional goals, but it also includes a whole set of aspects
related to labour relationships, most of which are key to
the attainment of goals.
Underlying the attainment of efficiency and quality of
care, the way in which workers are linked to the model is
crucial to guarantee adequate performance. Addressing
workers takes into consideration not only juridical and
economic aspects but also motivational elements to har-
monize relationships between management and work-
force. These issues belong to what some authors
understand as "organizational culture" [9].
For example, in the Jalisco MOH, putting innovations
into practice is an expression of its organizational culture.
The MOH of Jalisco is known nationwide for introducing
changes - within the limits that the law imposes on public
institutions - to improve the provision of services and
respond to population needs. The present paper focuses
on the latter aspects and aims to depict and analyse a set
of opinions and perspectives provided by two main
groups of actors, managers and workers, about a manage-
rial innovation represented by the contracting-out strat-
egy. The analysis of these opinions will allow us to
identify differential views on similar issues, and identify
challenges and opportunities that can lead us to improve
the managerial process of contracting-out.
Within this scope, the evidence provided by the study
results can potentially benefit Mexico and many other
developing countries embarking on the process of con-
tracting-out health services. The study highlights a group
of risks that can impede the attainment of the contracting
model objectives. Among them are included the decay in
labour conditions, the lack of incentives for contracted
personnel and the administrative workload represented
by the surveillance of productivity to estimate payment
levels. Based on the previous statement, some of the main
lessons highlight the need to create a system of incentives
to promote a balance between efficiency and quality, and
to implement a clearly defined monitoring system oper-
ated by adequately trained personnel to carry out this
complex task.
The reform of the Mexican health care system and the 
onset of contracting-out
Since 1943 the Mexican health care system had adopted a
segmented structure separating social security from the
public system [10]. By the 1980s the system entered into
a deep crisis expressed by its inability to fully cover the
population and by the under-financing of the public sys-
tem.
As a response to the crisis, the system initiated an impor-
tant stage of reform. Various authors agree that the decen-
tralization of health services in the early 1980s - the first
stage of the reform - resulted in a chain of dynamic
changes still felt today. These changes sought to address
the needs of the population group not covered by social
security services [11].
Decentralization was an important and strategic phase to
redistribute the financial responsibility for health care
between the states and the federal level. The process was
initiated in states with greater local, financial, human and
material resources, but it encountered difficulties and was
interrupted from 1988 to 1994. In 1995, decentralization
was reinitiated in a second stage and was declared com-
pleted in 1999.
Although decentralization itself did not resolve the finan-
cial and equity-related problems of the health system
[12], over time some states have taken advantage of the
process to increase their decision-making capacity regard-
ing resource allocation, thus reducing the role of the fed-
eral government in this sphere.
Furthermore, this increase in autonomy promoted inno-
vation that was primarily financed with state funds. State
health bureaucrats, or technocrats, began to play a role in
the conceptualization of the local system [3]. These tech-
nocracies have been structured around state governments;
it is not possible to distinguish which political party most
supports them [13].Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:79 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/79
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In the case of the State of Jalisco, located in western Mex-
ico, this group of health technocrats comprised individu-
als with solid academic training at Mexican and
international institutions, and with significant experience
in the political sphere. Main sociodemographic and
health features of Jalisco appear in Table 1. Jalisco was
decentralized during the second period; however from
1983 to 1995, prior to its decentralization, different
projects had been put forth. In many cases these projects
(e.g. the Mental Health Model) became points of refer-
ence for other states.
Early on, Jalisco started to investigate the option of incor-
porating private sector participation in the public health
system. The state is characterized by a high level of indus-
trial development, influenced by free-market thinking in
the economic and political spheres. In this context the
idea of total state dominion over public policy is less
acceptable than in other states [14]. As such, the possibil-
ity of private participation in the public health sector did
not meet with resistance by the stakeholders, as in other
states. Currently this strategy has been incorporated in dif-
ferent MOH programmes in Jalisco.
History and general characteristics of the model
In the mid-1990s, technocrats in the Ministry of Health of
the State of Jalisco had realized that despite efforts to
extend health care coverage through federal programmes,
there were still population groups, particularly in rural
and semi-urban areas that did not have continuous access
to primary and secondary level health care. There were
two options to extend coverage: (1) construct new units in
the public health network, or (2) contract private provid-
ers. The latter was favoured after costing exercises showed
that building additional infrastructure was not financially
viable.
To carry out the decentralization process in Jalisco, the
state and federal authorities agreed to create an institution
called the Decentralized Public Agency (DPA), which
could carry out functions that the Secretary of Health was
forbidden by law to carry out, such as the contracting of
private sector services and providers. In practice the DPA
and the Jalisco MOH coordinated with each other in order
to carry out the duties of the health sector and generally
the same person headed both organizations.
In 1997, the state government earmarked budgetary funds
that would finance and permit the operation of the new
programme to contract health teams and hospitals to pro-
vide services to the population not covered by a social
security institution. As a requisite for contracting, two
types of services were selected: a basic health unit that
consisted of a physician, nurse and health technician who
worked as a team to provide health services in rural areas.
General hospitals that offered basic specialties (surgery,
paediatrics, gynaecology/obstetrics and internal medi-
cine) made up the second provider type.
The basic health unit contracted personnel for a defined
period of time (usually three months) through renewable
contracts. Payment varies by job category. For example,
physicians receive a fixed salary equivalent to 50% of the
permanent MOH physician salary. The remainder is vari-
able and calculated based on monthly productivity
(defined primarily as the number of consultations). The
other categories of health personnel also receive a fixed
salary complemented by productivity payments, based on
indicators related to their activities (e.g. number of home
visits, immunizations administered).
By 2002, MOH bureaucrats looked for a budgetary
increase to incorporate more basic units and hospitals
into the contracting model. In negotiations with the State
of Jalisco Treasury, the source of all resources for the
model, MOH top managers put forth three main argu-
ments: (1) the contracting model was able to expand cov-
erage to communities without health care access, (2) it
Table 1: Characteristics of the State of Jalisco (circa 2005)
Mexico Jalisco
GNP per capita (US dollars) 7,143.95 (2006)* 6,797.26 (2006)*
% population covered by social security 47,193,861  (45.6% of Mexican population) (2006)** 3,516,645  (51.3% of Jalisco population) (2006)**
Physicians per 1000 inhabitants 1.3 (2004) 1.3 (2004)
Health expenditure as % of GNP 2.9 (2006)*** 3.1 (2006)***
Population 104,874,282  (2006)* 6,843,469 (2006)*
*Source: http://www.seijal.gob.mx/cd/jalisco_entorno/Temas/pib.html [Consulted 27/10/2009]
** Source: http://www.sinais.salud.gob.mx/demograficos/poblacion.html [Consulted 27/10/2009] 
*** Source: Salud México 2001-2005. Statistical Annex 1.12 (p. 182)Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:79 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/79
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was cheaper to contract-out providers than build units
and hire permanent personnel, and (3) in order to boost
the positive effects of the model, a financial increase was
needed. These arguments were founded both politically
and technically and finally the decision was made to
expand the model's coverage. The budget increased by
nearly 100% between 2002 and 2004; the majority of this
additional investment went to expanding the number of
basic health units.
A key technical aspect of the model is the regulatory mech-
anism. This mechanism is complex: one of its goals is to
calculate the precise amount of the additional productiv-
ity-based payment made to health personnel. Each month
the basic health unit personnel report their productivity to
the health jurisdiction, which then forwards the reports to
the central coordinating offices in Guadalajara. Based on
productivity reports, the coordinating office estimates the
additional payment. Statistical records are maintained at
the central level to monitor performance over time. When
a provider surpasses the monthly average, a technical
audit of the basic health unit or hospital goes into effect.
This purpose of the audit is to understand the change in
performance and is based on a review of patient charts
maintained by health personnel. A systematic monthly
audit is also carried out in randomly selected units in
order to review productivity and medical charts.
The basic health units are distributed throughout Jalisco,
primarily in localities that lack a public health centre. The
specific criteria are that these units be located in localities
with a population of no more than 2500, without local
public health services and with the nearest public health
clinic more than one hour away via public transportation.
Undoubtedly, the topic of private sector incorporation in
the development and implementation of public health
policy has been widely debated; its consequences have not
always been positive. The data presented in this article
focus on the perspectives of the primary care providers
and other key actors involved in the managerial process of
the contracting-out model, considering the model's
advantages and disadvantages to provide services to pop-
ulations in rural areas where public units were not availa-
ble.
Case description
Data collection
In 2004, the Mexican Health Foundation initiated a study
of the diverse models of public-private interaction in Mex-
ico's health sector. The case of Jalisco proves interesting
because there are currently few models of public-private
interaction for primary care service provision in the coun-
try. A case study was carried out with the aim of describing
the model's legal framework, financial mechanisms, link-
ing of private health care providers in the public network
and participation by health personnel.
To develop the case study, a set of qualitative, quantitative
and documenting techniques was applied with the aim of
gathering data to describe the model's origin, legal frame-
work, financial mechanisms and contracting of private
health providers. The participation and perspectives of
health personnel involved in the provision of services
were also documented, along with the use of contracts as
regulatory mechanisms, the supervision and control sys-
tems, user satisfaction with health care and the general
model outcomes. Through a descriptive analysis and tri-
angulation of the information obtained from different
sources, researchers were able gain in-depth knowledge
about the model's operation as well as the perspectives of
the actors involved.
Fieldwork was carried out between 2004 and 2005. The
population under study consisted of two main model par-
ticipants: decision-makers (at the Jalisco Ministry of
Health), private providers (doctors, nurses and health
promoters as well as MOH hospital managers).
To document the perspectives of private providers, a ques-
tionnaire was administered to a self-selected group com-
prising doctors, nurses and health technicians. The
questionnaire included the following topics: (1) sociode-
mographic profile, (2) motivations for accepting the con-
tract, (3) working conditions, (4) opinions about
supervision and indicators employed, and (5) opinion of
user satisfaction at their health unit. The instrument also
collected data on contract workers' future expectations
about their labour conditions and opinions about the
strengths and weaknesses of the contracting model.
The informants were selected in three stages. First the uni-
verse was defined considering 180 contracted workers in
all three categories (physicians, nurses and health pro-
moters), as documented in Jalisco MOH records. Second,
the questionnaire was mailed to all contracted health pro-
fessionals. Third, the completed questionnaires were
returned within one week to the payment office of the cor-
responding health jurisdiction. Questionnaires were then
delivered to the model's managers in Guadalajara and
finally to the researchers. From the total of 180 question-
naires, only 87 were completed and used for analysis. Self-
selection of the group did not allow researchers to make
any kind of inferential analysis.
Although the way in which the respondent group was
constructed is a major limitation for the interpretation of
the results, the group showed homogeneous characteris-
tics that responded to the criteria previously established
by researchers, namely: (1) all personnel were included inHuman Resources for Health 2009, 7:79 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/79
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the list of contracted personnel provided by the SSJ, (2) all
had the same contractual and payment conditions, (3) all
were supervised under the same scheme and (4) all were
located in rural and semi-urban areas without a public
health unit.
For the qualitative component, a total of 29 interviews
were carried out: seven interviews with top managers at
the Jalisco MOH, four with owners/managers of the hos-
pitals under contract and 18 with users of health services
units staffed by contracted private providers. Interviews
were semistructured. They lasted 60 minutes on average
and were conducted and audio-recorded by a team of
three field researchers. Informed consent for all inform-
ants was obtained prior to the beginning of the interview.
The selection of informants in the qualitative component
was purposeful and intentional, aiming to obtain the
most relevant information possible for the objectives of
the research project. Participants were selected according
to the degree to which they met the criteria originally
defined by the project. A common criterion for inclusion
for all informants was that they should possess knowledge
of and have direct participation in the model. Data were
processed by means of Atlas Ti software.
The information obtained from the different methodolo-
gies was contrasted and triangulated in order to confirm
the results and the analysis of the case study.
Health personnel profile
The numbers of basic health units and contracted person-
nel have increased in recent years. In 2003, 40 physicians
were contracted to work in the basic health units. By 2004
this number had increased to 180 persons, including phy-
sicians, nurses and health promoters. This group is organ-
ized into 52 basic health units working in 12 health
jurisdictions. Contracted physicians are generally young
residents, recent graduates or people who work as substi-
tutes, filling in for those on maternity leave, vacation or
some other type of leave. The nursing and health pro-
moter staff usually live in the communities they serve, are
known by the community, and in some cases have previ-
ously worked for the state MOH in a related area.
In reviewing the profile of the 87 contracted workers who
completed the survey, two points stand out: the majority
of contracted personnel are female (80%) and the distri-
bution of completed surveys among categories of health
personnel are relatively homogeneous (physicians 34.5%,
nurses 31% and health promoters 34.5%). As detailed in
Table 2, compared to the overall number of contracted
personnel, self-selection was consistent between occupa-
tional groups, but not by sex. However, the differences by
sex in completion of the survey are observed exclusively in
the health promoter category. Additionally, more than
half of all personnel in all categories (55%) have earned a
university degree. The contracted staff ages range from 21
to 50 years old, with an average age of 30.
Also worth noting is that 82% of the self-selected group
indicated work experience prior to joining the basic health
units. Of this group, 54% had worked in the public sector
and the other half in the private sector. Likewise, 45% of
those who had previous work experience worked, on aver-
age, between one and two years in their previous job.
The information presented in the following section
emerges from a mix of primary and secondary sources. All
tables and figures were produced from information col-
lected by the survey of practitioners and completed with
information obtained from MOH records.
Opinion of contracted personnel about the advantages 
and disadvantages of participating in the model
The basic health units require physical workspace for serv-
ice provision, equipped with adequate instruments and
supplies. The MOH negotiated with municipal authori-
ties, reaching an agreement whereby the municipalities
would supply the physical workspace and the Secretary
would supply the equipment and medications through
the public health supply system.
Table 2: Differences between total personnel contracted in basic health units and the self-selected group of respondents
Occupational category Total % M F Sample % M F
Physicians 71 39 32% 68% 30 34 30% 70%
Nurses 49 27 1% 99% 27 31 4% 96%
Promoters 60 33 55% 45% 30 34 17% 83%
Total 180 100 87 100
Source: Authors, with data from the health services providers' questionnaire. Research project on public-private interactions in the Mexican health 
sector.Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:79 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/79
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The result is working conditions that are not always ade-
quate, thereby reducing the capacity of the basic health
units to provide care in this minimal setting. According to
Figure 1, supply of medications is the biggest problem
encountered by health personnel, highlighted by 80% of
the respondents. Lack of equipment and inadequate phys-
ical space in terms of size, design, ventilation and lighting
were also important problems. Excess demand was not
mentioned as a major problem, given that more demand
generates greater income based on productivity.
Regarding the contractual agreements between the institu-
tions and private providers, two important aspects stand
out: the extent to which the personnel considered advan-
tageous (or disadvantageous) the contracting mechanism,
and the way in which salaries are calculated. Sixty-one per-
cent of the health workers considered the contracting
process somewhat advantageous, 29% considered it dis-
advantageous or very disadvantageous and only 7.6%
considered the mechanism advantageous or very advanta-
geous. This distribution suggests that the contracting proc-
ess is viewed ambiguously; health workers perceive both
the positive (flexibility in time) and negative aspects
(income level).
Table 3 shows the reasons the personnel qualified the
contract mechanism as advantageous or disadvantageous.
The questionnaires provided the opportunity for respond-
ents to spontaneously mention the reason underlying the
qualification. The majority of the reasons for a negative
opinion of the contracting process are related to person-
nel issues such as salary, lack of benefits, the duration of
the contract and the impossibility of obtaining a long-
term position. None of the reasons given for a disadvanta-
geous ranking mentioned the inability to provide quality
care, geographical proximity to the population receiving
care or the supervision that they receive. The qualification
of "somewhat advantageous" also centres on personal rea-
sons, but includes other reasons, such as combining this
job with other activities or simply having the opportunity
to work. The "advantageous" category is the only one that
considers geographical proximity to the target population.
In Table 3, each of the reasons within the three categories
is ranked according to the level of priority (1 to 10) that
each informant defined. The average priority level esti-
mated for all informants was used to rank them.
An underlying theme among the range of the opinions is
that those who accept contracts by the MOH do so with
the short- or medium-term goal of obtaining a permanent
position, with the accompanying benefits and rights that
the unionized, permanent workers enjoy. One non-
explicit factor related to aiming for a permanent position
- in addition to those points already mentioned in Table 3
is resistance to having payments and incentives based on
productivity and quality standards. In Table 4 the prefer-
ence of contracted personnel for a permanent position is
clear, a finding that is valid across the three health person-
nel categories. However, an important group of contrac-
tors prefers to maintain their current status for an
indefinite period. The proportion of groups expressing
other preferences is marginal. Finally, worth highlighting
Main service delivery problems faced by basic health unit personnel Figure 1
Main service delivery problems faced by basic health unit personnel. Source: Authors, with data from the health serv-
ices providers' questionnaire. Research project on public-private interactions in the Mexican health sector.
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is that among physicians, the possibility of working inde-
pendently in a private doctor's office is mentioned by only
a small proportion of cases.
Salary preferences reflect in part the previous tendency.
The majority of personnel would prefer a salary that is
constructed differently. As mentioned, personnel pay-
ments comprise a base salary (50% of total possible earn-
ings), to which productivity payments are added. This
model allows managers to promote productivity and effi-
ciency. Among permanent workers, productivity is meas-
ured but is not used for sanctions, in the case of low
productivity, or bonuses for high productivity. Incentives
are paid to salaried workers based on punctuality, which
is not a factor affecting efficiency. According to Figure 2 a
large group of contracted personnel (65%) suggests that
they should earn the same salary as permanent workers,
excluding productivity as a factor for calculating income.
Another important group (18%) would prefer the same
salary as permanent workers, without taking into account
benefits. The remaining groups represent small percent-
ages; there is a small group that considers their income
level to be fair.
Managers' perspective
The opinions of the health care providers - physicians,
nurses and promoters - are fundamental for understand-
ing the achievements and difficulties in operating the
model. However, their vision centres on the advantages
and problems related to their participation and underesti-
mates the implications for other actors. Thus the field-
work carried out for this study also gathered information
from managers.
As stated previously, the two most important objectives of
this model are to widen coverage to underserved areas
lacking public health infrastructure and to employ
resources using strict efficiency-based criteria. In order to
meet the first objective, the specific areas for deployment
of basic health units must be defined, which to date has
largely been achieved. It is the state MOH, and not the
contracted personnel, that defines the locations for the
teams. The strategy to accomplish the second objective is
through ensuring a competitive salary, similar to that of
unionized workers, initially without considering other
benefits such as social security, pensions, etc. However,
health authorities have pointed out an important increase
Table 3: Basic health unit personnel reasons for characterizing the contracting mechanism as advantageous or disadvantageous
Category Reasons
Somewhat advantageous 1. Salary and benefits drawbacks
2. Cannot accumulate seniority
3. Renewing contracts is dependent on productivity
4. Untimely salary payments
5. Short contract period (three months)
6. Job insecurity
7. Few benefits
8. No medical insurance
9. No refresher or continuing education courses
10. Greater workload than those with permanent position
11. Can combine this job with other activities
12. Opportunity to work
Disadvantageous or very disadvantageous 1. Fewer rights than permanent personnel
2. Cannot accumulate seniority
3. Short contract period
4. Salary and benefits drawback
5. Greater workload than those with permanent position
6. Job insecurity
7. Undefined job activities
8. No social security benefits
9. Untimely salary payments
Advantageous or very advantageous 1. Productivity payments
2. Recent provision of health insurance
3. Ability to work in their community
4. Opportunity to work
Source: Authors, with data from the health services providers' questionnaire. Research project on public-private interactions in the Mexican health 
sector.Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:79 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/79
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in the workload of medical personnel and managers
assigned to measure the productivity and supervise per-
sonnel under contract. The lack of trained personnel to
carry out this task could represent an obstacle to its sus-
tainability.
According to state MOH authorities, achieving the
model's objectives is more important than the way it func-
tions. They consider the contracting of health personnel
both fundamental and instrumental to meeting objec-
tives. State as well as jurisdictional authorities consider
that basic health unit productivity can be 100% greater
than that of the public health network. They cite, for
example, that the average number of consultations per
day in a basic health unit is between 20 and 30, and that
in a standard public health centre it ranges from 10 to 14.
Other aspects highlighted by these informants are related
to a strong commitment of contracted personnel to their
job: combining a sense of responsibility and respect for
supervisors, meeting immunization goals (a productivity
measure), increasing service demand, greater prenatal care
coverage resulting in a decreased risk of maternal mortal-
ity, and increased efficiency in resource allocation. Man-
agers also mentioned the high level of satisfaction among
the health units' target population, this being one of the
model's corollary achievements. Indeed, for many sites
the services provided by these units constitutes the first
time that formal health care services have been offered in
a continuous manner in their area.
Managers appreciate that they have a high level of control
over health unit performance through the use of indica-
tors concerning personnel activities. An important issue
with the contracting model is that the union, a powerful
actor in the negotiation of labour conditions for workers,
has been limited to recommending personnel to be con-
Table 4: Basic health unit personnel preferences regarding contracts
Preference of health unit personnel regarding contracts % Basic health unit personnel
Total Physicians Nurses Others
Maintain indefinitely 17 21 22 13
Maintain until finding other job 1 4
Obtain a permanent position with the State Health Secretary 67 70 55 77
Obtain a permanent position in another public institution 2 4 3
Work independently, in profession 1 3
Other 23 4
Don't know; no response 10 3 11 7
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors, with data from the health services providers' questionnaire. Research project on public-private interactions in the Mexican health 
sector.
Basic health unit personnel payment preferences Figure 2
Basic health unit personnel payment preferences. 
Source: Authors, with data from the health services provid-
ers' questionnaire. Research project on public-private inter-
actions in the Mexican health sector.
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tracted. The final decision as to how contracting is carried
out rests with the state health authorities.
Discussion and Evaluation
This paper describes the perception of managers and con-
tracted workers participating in the operation of a model
that contracts private providers using public funds in the
State of Jalisco, Mexico. This contractual model is unique
in Mexico, yet it has been inspired by similar initiatives in
other developed and developing countries [15]. During its
10 years of existence, the model has advanced in various
aspects. It has mobilized significant public resources from
the state-level Treasury, permitting a greater number of
basic health unit personnel to be contracted. As a conse-
quence, coverage of populations living in rural areas has
increased.
It must be stated initially that contracting has a quite spe-
cific connotation in the Mexican health system. For most
managers and workers, to contract a person means to
establish a labour relationship that makes that person an
employee of the institution. For most contracted workers,
this way of engaging the institution is the first step to
becoming a permanent worker, although this may not
necessarily be the case. Contracting has a distinctively dif-
ferent meaning in other contexts.
In England, for example, where general practitioners are
contracted to provide primary care services, they regard
themselves as private contractors who have the freedom to
maintain an engagement with the public sector or to run
their private business. Despite changes that occurred in
the 1990s regarding the organization of group practices
and the system of incentives and clinical performance, the
basic idea of the general practitioner (GP) as a contractor
and not as a salaried worker remains [16]. This difference
permeates the understanding of the contracting-out
model.
A further difference that should be highlighted is that Eng-
lish GPs are paid under a capitation scheme to provide
incentives for promotion and prevention activities. No
contracting-out scheme in Mexico has attempted to pay
under a capitation scheme and the Jalisco MOH is no
exception. Workers in this model are paid a basic allow-
ance and on top of this an extra payment for productivity.
Liu X [17] show that most contracting-out schemes do not
consider capitation as the main option for paying provid-
ers. Setting up a capitation payment scheme is neither
administratively nor culturally appealing in the Mexican
context.
As shown in other studies [18], the perception of any
given phenomenon varies according to the position that
each actor has within the institution. The organizational
culture that prevails in the Jalisco MOH includes the pos-
sibility of developing innovations to improve the per-
formance of the health system. Innovations are generally
proposed by managers but not always accepted by all
actors involved, and the study shows that there are many
issues involved in implementing the model that are not
valued equally by actors in different positions in the insti-
tutional structure. The results presented above confirm
the variation in the perceptions of different types of actors.
The model's managers focus on the achievement of the
model's objectives, highlighting results in the form of
increased coverage of populations who, prior to the
model's implementation, had no access to formal health
services, as well as the efficient use of resources based on
the differences in the productivity/investment ratio
between contracted and public units. Labour conditions
of contracted personnel and the effect of these conditions
on their productivity and quality of care are not relevant
issues in their discourse.
Unlike managers, contracted personnel focus on the con-
ditions under which workers are contracted. Even though
contracted personnel do not outright reject or critique the
model, the desire to obtain better working conditions and
job security is clear. Workers clearly seek a permanent staff
position in the Ministry of Health. From their perspective,
the increase in coverage and efficient use of resources does
not represent a great achievement of the model.
This gap in actors' perspectives has important medium-
and long-term implications for the model. Extending cov-
erage is an unquestionable achievement, but the achieve-
ment of efficiency less so. The positive relation obtained
between investment and productivity diminishes the pos-
sibility of increasing the investment to improve workers'
labour conditions. Increasing economic incentives, medi-
cal care, bonus payments and even ensuring continuity
and stability in the contracted position require greater
financial investment.
Given the nature of the work, it is important to provide an
appropriate job offer and package of benefits. In this
sense, contracting models should consider provision of
these benefits to be a productive investment. However,
managers should maintain the prerogative to monitor
and supervise the performance of contracted workers in
order to ensure high quality of care over time.
According to Dal Poz, by the year 2000 in Brazil there
were different modalities of contracting health workers,
all with advantages and disadvantages for managers and
workers. Most of these contracts provided flexible work-
ing conditions for employees, yet normally did not meet
the country's legal labour requirements. This trend dem-Human Resources for Health 2009, 7:79 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/7/1/79
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onstrates the advancement of structural reforms and the
impact they are having on the labour conditions of health
workers [19]. Preserving adequate labour conditions is
fundamental when contracting of health workers is
undertaken.
The perspective of managers and workers regarding con-
tracting-out services has not been widely documented
internationally. In Canada, it was found that the contract-
ing of more than 8000 workers in British Columbia since
2002 has produced more negative effects than positive,
according to the workers' perspective [20]. Among those
issues relevant to workers are low pay, meager benefits,
heavy workloads, poor training and no job security.
A report published by USAID/PSP-One [21] points out
the importance of an adequate managerial strategy in the
contracting-out process for reproductive health services.
Drawing lessons from Bangladesh, Cambodia and Guate-
mala, the document stresses the relevance of transforming
the ideological position of managers in order to make
them capable of undertaking their new functions as con-
tractors of services, including the negotiation of contracts
and the monitoring of contractor performance. The docu-
ment also points out the necessity of good coordination
between purchasers and providers in order to prevent con-
flicts. The parties, according to the document, should
mutually develop performance goals, identify potential
sources of conflict and establish cooperative ways to
resolve problems that may arise during contract perform-
ance. Communication is part of a successful managerial
strategy.
Conclusion
As these results are generated from an exploratory study,
the findings are not conclusive. However, findings clearly
point out the importance of acknowledging the goal
achievement perspective expressed by managers and the
labour rights perspective expressed by workers. No doubt
both are necessary and reconcilable. Achieving efficiency
should not be an objective to attain at the expense of mak-
ing vulnerable the rights of workers to have a decent
income and benefits under the given labour regulations of
countries.
It is likely that the model has had an effect on productiv-
ity, quality of care and efficiency in the provision of serv-
ices. The performance of the state MOH has been
important from both the technical and political perspec-
tives. Technically, there are three key aspects in the
model's operation. The first is the contracting mechanism,
which allows the state MOH to determine the geographi-
cal location of the basic health units and to ensure their
permanency, traditionally the Achilles' heel of the coun-
try's primary health care system. Health personnel are
usually reluctant to relocate to far-removed communities
and be subjected to productivity measures. The second
key aspect of the model's success is the ability to link pro-
ductivity to salary payments, thereby increasing the
number of services offered and optimizing resources. The
third element, and perhaps the most important for the
achievement of efficiency, is the implementation of a
strict regulatory and oversight system, which punctually
and systematically reports personnel productivity, thereby
permitting negotiation and discussion of those instances
where productivity falls outside the norm.
Politically, the health authorities have been able to imple-
ment a model for almost 10 years with the support of the
state Treasury authorities, and have benefited from a
budgetary increase in recent years. They have also estab-
lished an agreement with the health workers' union,
obtaining the union's tolerance of the model.
Labour rights for contracted workers and the model's
rationale for widening health care coverage and increasing
quality and efficiency of resource allocation are not irrec-
oncilable. In fact, the model has shown flexibility through
introducing modifications that allow workers to increase
their benefits. Recently the state Ministry of Health and
the contracted workers have been negotiating benefits
such as the provision of a major medical health insurance
plan and the possibility of making payments into a per-
sonal retirement fund. Doubtless, these improvements in
working conditions could produce a positive impact on
fundamental aspects such as the long-term sustainability
of the model, political support of workers for the model,
the development of a quality-of-care culture in which
worker satisfaction plays an important role and the possi-
bility of replicating the model in other regions in Mexico
and other developing countries in a consistent and viable
manner to extend health services to the poor.
The results presented and discussed in the paper may be
relevant for other experiences in developing countries.
Thousands of workers are being contracted on a tempo-
rary basis today. Health systems rationalists trust that con-
tracting could be a good option to improve health services
performance. However, the decision to contract-out
health services should follow a cautious approach in
which the opinions of directly involved actors are consid-
ered in the implementation strategy.
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